Physics frequently relies on idealised models: frictionless planes, point particles, perfect vacuums, and perfectly isolated systems. These simplifications are pragmatic tools, yet they are often implicitly treated as ontological realities.
This is the distortion: methodological convenience is mistaken for the nature of existence itself.
The Physics Move
Classical mechanics assumes frictionless surfaces and massless pulleys to simplify calculations.
Quantum models often rely on isolated systems or idealised potentials that cannot exist in reality.
Cosmological models employ perfect homogeneity or isotropy, smoothing over the complexity of actual structure.
Why This Overextends Ontology
Idealisation cannot capture actuality, yet treating it as if it does:
Suggests the world behaves like the model, rather than the model approximating the world.
Conceals relational complexity by substituting a simplified scenario for real interactions.
Reinforces the illusion that abstraction or convenience reflects reality directly.
The distortion lies in reifying simplification: the approximated becomes mistaken for the actual.
The Relational Reframing
From a relational standpoint:
Friction, discreteness, entanglement, and environmental interactions are features of relational actualisation, not violations of idealised models.
Idealised constructs are epistemic tools for calculation and intuition; their “existence” is symbolic, not ontological.
Recognising idealisation as methodological scaffolding preserves clarity about how relational dynamics actually unfold.
Thus, idealisation is intelligible — but only as a pragmatic simplification, not a constituent of reality.
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